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Notes
LEGAL SERVICES CORP. V. VELAZQUEZ: A PROBLEMATIC
COMMINGLING OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND
PUBLIC FORA ANALYSES YIELDS A NEW GREY AREA
FOR FREE SPEECH
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,' the United States Supreme
Court considered whether Congress violated the First Amendment 2 of
the United States Constitution when it denied Legal Services Corpora-
tion (LSC) funding to attorneys representing welfare recipients who
wished to change or challenge existing welfare laws.' In a 5-4 deci-
sion, the Court held that the condition imposed by Congress on LSC
funding violated the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech.4
The Court reasoned that the restriction suppressed private speech
and insulated the Government's view of existing welfare law from judi-
cial review.5 In so holding, the majority inappropriately applied the
Court's public fora and unconstitutional conditions precedent to the
facts of Velazquez. It would have been more prudent for the Court to
have analyzed Velazquez as a case of content-based discrimination be-
cause the condition banned LSC clients from challenging or defend-
ing existing welfare law.6 Although the LSC funding restriction did
constitute content-based discrimination, the Court should have found
the restriction constitutional because Congress allowed LSC grantees
to use separate, privately funded affiliates to engage in the proscribed
representation.7
1. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
2. The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. All further references
to the First Amendment will concern only the Freedom of Speech Clause.
3. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 536-37.
4. Id. at 537.
5. Id. at 548-49.
6. Id. at 551 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that LSC litigants may neither challenge
existing welfare law nor defend those laws during the course of litigation).
7. See Fed. Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400
(1984) (explaining that a grantee may engage in activities proscribed by a conditional
subsidy through the use of nonfederal funds and an affiliate organization).
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I. THE CASE
In 1974 Congress created LSC to provide "financial support for
legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings or matters to persons fi-
nancially unable to afford legal assistance."' In section 504(a) (16) of
the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of
1996 (OCRAA), Congress forbade LSC grantees from using LSC fund-
ing to litigate on behalf of clients who desired to change or challenge
existing welfare laws.9 The restriction even proscribed welfare law
challenges that became apparent during LSC funded litigation.1"
Congress prohibited LSC grantees from using non-LSC funds to en-
gage in litigation forbidden by section 504(a) (16) (the proviso) unless
the grantees created a sufficiently separate affiliate organization that
satisfied certain program integrity requirements."
Various groups in the state of New York filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York challenging,
on First Amendment grounds, the constitutionality of the section
504(a) (16) proviso of OCRAA that barred LSC representation of cli-
ents who wished to amend or challenge existing welfare law.12 The
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (1994).
9. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-134, § 504(a) (16), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-55 to-56. Section 504(a) (16) of the Act stated:
None of the funds appropriated in this Act to the Legal Services Corporation may
be used to provide financial assistance to any person or entity (which may be
referred to in this section as a "recipient") .. .that initiates legal representation
or participates in any other way, in litigation, lobbying, or rulemaking, involving
an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system, except that this paragraph
shall not be construed to preclude a recipient from representing an individual
eligible client who is seeking specific relief from a welfare agency if such relief
does not involve an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing law in effect
on the date of the initiation of the representation ....
Id. Each annual appropriations act since 1996 also forbade LSC grantees from using LSC
funds to represent a welfare recipient who wished to change or challenge existing welfare
law. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 538.
10. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 544-45.
11. Legal Services Corporation, 45 C.F.R. § 1610.8(a) (2000).
12. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). Sections
504(a)(2)-(5), (7), (11)-(13), (15), and (18) were also challenged by the plaintiffs. Id. at
328. These sections, among other things, prohibited the use of LSC funds for attempts to:
influence the issuance, amendment, or revocation of any executive orders; influence adju-
dicatory proceedings if determinative of agency policy; influence legislation; influence
oversight of LSC; participate in class action suits; provide legal assistance for certain aliens;
conduct training to encourage political or labor related activity; collect attorney's fees; and
litigate on behalf of incarcerated persons. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appro-
priations Act of 1996 § 504(a). This list is not exhaustive, but it serves to demonstrate the
breadth of the plaintiffs' claim. The plaintiffs also alleged that the challenged portions of
section 504 violated the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
Velazquez, 985 F. Supp. at 337.
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plaintiffs included current LSC grantees, organizations and their at-
torneys who wished to receive grants from LSC but were prohibited
from doing so under the proviso, persons represented by LSC attor-
neys, and public and private groups who donated nonfederal funds to
LSC grantees.13 As relief, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunc-
tion to enjoin enforcement of section 504(a)'s challenged sections.14
The court denied the preliminary injunction, 15 explaining that sec-
tion 504(a) did not violate the Free Speech Clause because the First
Amendment did not require Congress to "fund the exercise of consti-
tutional rights." 6 The plaintiffs then appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit to determine whether the LSC funding
restrictions violated the First Amendment.17
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a pre-
liminary injunction for all of the challenged LSC funding restrictions,
except for the proviso.18 The court held that the proviso constituted
viewpoint-based discrimination because it granted funding to rep-
resent eligible LSC clients, but denied funding to those who wished to
challenge existing welfare laws.' 9 The Second Circuit acknowledged
that the government may subsidize one program without funding an
alternative program.2 ° However, the Second Circuit opined that the
Supreme Court would not construe its own explanation in Rust v. Sul-
livan to allow subsidies that virtually bar recipients from challenging
the government's laws.2" The Second Circuit supported its rationale
by recognizing varying degrees of First Amendment protection for dif-
ferent types of speech and allocating the most protection to speech
advocating governmental change.22 Furthermore, the court declared
that forbidding a LSC attorney to challenge welfare laws in court "ef-
13. Velazquez, 985 F. Supp. at 323-24.
14. Id. at 326.
15. Id. at 327.
16. Id. at 343. The court also rejected the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claims because
the plaintiffs were not "absolutely precluded from engaging in prohibited activities" and
possessed no "constitutional entitlement" to LSC services. Id. at 344. Furthermore, the
Court noted that Congress had a rational basis to justify its restrictions. Id.
17. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 763 (2d Cir. 1999). The court also
considered whether LSC's final regulations were a reasonable interpretation of the 1996
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act. Id. The Second Circuit ulti-
mately found that LSC permissibly interpreted the statute. Id. at 764.
18. Id. at 773.
19. Id. at 769-70.
20. Id. at 771. The court explained that under Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193
(1991), the First Amendment allowed the government to subsidize one solution to a prob-
lem without funding alternate solutions to that problem. Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 771.
21. Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 771.
22. Id.
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fectively drives the idea from the marketplace where it can most effec-
tively be offered. ' 23 Accordingly, the Second Circuit reversed the
lower court's decision, instead finding the proviso unconstitutional
under the First Amendment.24 In so doing, the court decided to sever
the proviso from section 504(a)(16).25
The plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Court granted certiorari to consider whether the proviso violated
the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to free speech.26 In particular,
the Court reviewed the nature of the proviso in light of two occasion-
ally overlapping lines of First Amendment precedent-cases involving
a government-created limited forum for speech and cases involving a
government-created subsidy for specified ends.
27
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Content-based discrimination and viewpoint-based discrimination
are two concepts that arise in free speech cases. Viewpoint-based dis-
crimination exists when the government regulates or designs a subsidy
to penalize or suppress a person's point of view.28 Content-based dis-
crimination exists when the government seeks to prohibit discussion
of an entire topic or subject matter, regardless of the speaker's views. 29
The Court considers viewpoint-based discrimination to be a particu-
larly "egregious form of content discrimination." ° Because view-
point-based discrimination is a subset of content-based discrimination,
the Court has acknowledged that the distinction between the two is
not always exact.3 l Nevertheless, viewpoint-based and content-based
23. Id. at 772. The Second Circuit explained that dicta in National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), suggested that the Court would have found unconstitu-
tional a NEA requirement to take into consideration decency and respect in funding arts if
the NEA had imposed a well-defined limit on decency and respect considerations that
drove prohibited ideas from the marketplace. Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 772.
24. Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 773. The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling on
the plaintiffs' other challenges. Id.
25. Id. The Second Circuit could not determine Congress's intent for including sec-
tion 504(a) (16) in the legislation, nor could the court establish whether Congress would
have allowed LSC funding without the proviso. See id. at 772-73. The court decided to
sever only the proviso because it felt that the remaining portion of section 504(a) (16) was
still functional as written. Id. at 773.
26. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 536-37.
27. See id. at 543-44 (noting that the matter before the Court involved a government
subsidy, but asserting that principles of forum analysis provided guidance for deciding the
case).
28. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587.
29. Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1987).
30. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
31. Id. at 831.
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discrimination are at the heart of the Supreme Court's two doctrines
for analyzing subsidy restrictions: unconstitutional conditions analysis
and public forum analysis.
One application of the Court's unconstitutional conditions analy-
sis questions whether a conditional grant of government funding
abridges the grantees' freedom of speech.32 Upon a determination
that content-based or viewpoint-based discrimination exists, the Court
will uphold the speech restriction only if it is "narrowly tailored" to
achieve "a substantial government interest."3 A court may justify con-
tent-based discrimination if the subsidy allows a sufficiently separate,
privately funded affiliate of the grantee to engage in the proscribed
speech.34 Moreover, the Court will not find First Amendment viola-
tions, and subsequently not apply strict scrutiny, if the government has
merely refused to fund a constitutional right.35 To complicate matters
further, subsidies themselves can promote a diversity of views from
private speakers, and in those instances the Court has used its limited
public fora First Amendment analysis to guide its decision.36
The Court has used public fora analysis to determine the extent
to which Congress may limit speech in areas with varying degrees of
public access, such as public parks, school board meetings, or United
States Postal Service property.37 The Court recognizes three catego-
ries of fora and uses different criteria for each to determine whether
government speech restrictions violate the First Amendment.38 In
traditional public fora,39 the state may create content-based restric-
tions, but those restrictions must pass the strict scrutiny test.4° Any
32. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544-45 (1983).
33. See Fed. Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380
(1984) ("[T]hese restrictions have been upheld only when we were satisfied that the re-
striction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial government interest .... "); see also
Regan, 461 U.S. at 547 (stating that a statute which "interfere[s] with the exercise of a
fundamental right, such as the freedom of speech," will be subject to a heightened "level of
scrutiny").
34. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400.
35. Regan, 461 U.S. at 549.
36. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30, 834 (applying forum analysis to a Student Activ-
ity Fund that created only a "metaphysical" forum); Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S.
217, 229-30 (2000) (acknowledging that the student activities fund is not a public forum,
but finding the public forum "viewpoint neutrality" standard controlling).
37. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)
(describing the three types of public fora and appropriate standards to safeguard speech in
each).
38. See id. at 4546.
39. The Court mentioned streets and parks as examples of traditional public fora. Id.
at 45.
40. Id. Such restrictions must be "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and...
narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Id.
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content-neutral "time, place, and manner of expression" regulation
also must pass strict scrutiny and leave open sufficient avenues of ex-
pression." Limited fora exist where the government opens or
designates public property for expressive activity.4 2 The government
does not have to "indefinitely retain the open character" of a limited
public forum; however, "as long as it does so it is bound by the same
standards as . . . in a traditional public forum."43 The nonpublic fo-
rum theory allows the government to exclude speech based on con-
tent if the exclusion is reasonable considering the forum's established
boundaries.4 4 The Court considers viewpoint-based discrimination to
be a flagrant type of content-based discrimination and presumes view-
point-based discrimination is unconstitutional when the proscribed
speech falls within a forum's expressive limits.4 5 The Court occasion-
ally uses public fora analysis when examining a subsidy for First
Amendment violations,4 6 but public fora and unconstitutional condi-
tions analyses may be used independently of each other as well.4 7
A. The Unconstitutional Conditions Cases
In Speiser v. Randall,4" the Court considered the constitutionality
of a California law that attempted to condition the receipt of certain
forms of tax relief upon the relinquishment of some forms of
speech.4 9 The Court held that the State of California could not re-
quire a veteran to sign a loyalty oath as a condition to receiving a
property tax credit.50 The Court determined that the condition had
41. Id.
42. Id. The Court does not initially use the term "limited public forum" to describe
this forum, but it does so later in the opinion. Id. at 47. The Court noted that in limited
fora the government may limit access to certain grounds or permit discussion of only speci-
fied topics. Id. at 46 n.7. For example, a university may limit access to a forum of its own
creation to students of that university. Id.
43. Id. at 46.
44. Id. A nonpublic forum for expressive activity exists on "[p]ublic property which is
not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication." Id. at 46. Although
the Perry Court does not initially refer to this type of forum as nonpublic, it does so in later
discussion. Id, at 53-54.
45. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995).
46. See id. at 830 (describing the dispersal of a Student Activity Fund at a public univer-
sity as a "metaphysical" forum).
47. See generally Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (discussing a lobby-
ing restriction on use of a federal subsidy solely in terms of unconstitutional conditions
analysis); see also Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (discussing access to a public school's inter-
nal mail system solely in terms of forum analysis).
48. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
49. Id. at 517.
50. Id. at 528-29. The oath stated: "I do not advocate the overthrow of the Government
of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful
2002]
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"the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed
speech," and that it was "aimed at the suppression of dangerous
ideas." 1 The Court held that the State did not have a compelling
interest in abridging the veteran's speech through a procedure that
placed the burden of proving loyalty on the subscribing veteran. 2
Therefore, the majority determined that the tax credit denial consti-
tuted an abridgement of speech without the safeguards of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.53
In Cammarano v. United States,54 the Court distinguished Speiser's
viewpoint-based discrimination from a viewpoint-neutral subsidy ex-
clusion.55 The Cammarano Court held that the government was not
required to compensate a person for the costs of engaging in constitu-
tionally protected activities. 56 The Court distinguished the case from
Speiserby explaining that the Cammarano plaintiffs were not denied tax
relief because they engaged in constitutionally protected speech;
rather, they were merely made to pay for that speech with their own
money.57 As a result, the Court concluded that the tax exemption was
nondiscriminatory.58
The Court reaffirmed the teachings of Cammarano in Regan v.
Taxation with Representation.59 In Regan the Court held that a federal
law which denied tax relief to an organization that wished to lobby did
not violate the First Amendment.6 ° The Court reasoned that the de-
nial of tax relief was simply a matter of Congress refusing to pay for
means, nor advocate the support of a foreign government against the United States in
event of hostilities." Id. at 515.
51. Id. at 519 (quoting, in part, Am. Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402
(1950)).
52. Id. at 529. In addition to subscribing to the loyalty oath, the veteran bore the bur-
den of proving his loyalty if it were questioned in any judicial or administrative proceed-
ings related to the tax exemption. Id. at 522.
53. Id. The Court held that due process required the State to bear the burden of
proof, not the veteran. See id.
54. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
55. See id. at 513 (noting that the tax exemption at issue in Speiser prohibited recipients
from espousing one viewpoint, but the tax deduction at issue in Cammarano was nondis-
criminatory in application).
56. Id. In Cammarano, the Court considered the validity of Treasury Regulations that
denied tax exemptions to an organization when the organization had engaged in lobbying.
Id. at 499-500. The regulations denied tax deductions for "sums of money expended for
lobbying purposes, the promotion or defeat of legislation, the exploitation of propaganda,
including advertising other than trade advertising .... " Id.
57. Id. at 513.
58. Id.
59. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
60. Id. at 546.
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lobbying with public funds." The Court justified its ruling, in part, by
explaining that Taxation with Representation (TWR) could operate
under both tax-exempt status and non-tax-exempt status as long as
TWR created a sufficiently separate, privately funded affiliate for
lobbying.
6 2
In Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters, 3
the Court found unconstitutional section 399 of the Public Broadcast-
ing Act of 1967, which prohibited federally funded educational broad-
casting stations from editorializing.64 After discerning that section
399 discriminated based on the content of the broadcasters' speech,
the Court found that section 399's ban was not narrowly tailored to
address the harms that substantiated an abridgement of speech.65
However, following Regan's affiliate justification, the Court stated that
61. Id.
62. See id. at 544; see also id. at 552-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that the
constitutional defect" created by prohibiting entities from lobbying was cured by allowing
the entity to create a separately funded affiliate for lobbying purposes). TWR sought to lift
the lobbying prohibition in section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code because re-
moving the prohibition would give TWR a tax exemption and allow it to use tax deductible
contributions. Regan, 461 U.S. at 543-44. TWR also challenged the tax law under the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment because it allowed veteran groups that
lobbied to receive tax-exempt contributions. Id. at 546. The Court found that this ar-
rangement did not violate the Fifth Amendment because it was rational for Congress to
subsidize veterans' lobbying as a reward for their service to the nation while denying the
same subsidy to other groups that wanted to promote their own "private interests." Id. at
550-51.
63. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
64. Id. at 402. The statute provided: "No commercial educational broadcasting station
which receives a grant from the Corporation under subpart C of this part may engage in
editorializing. No noncommercial educational broadcasting station may support or op-
pose any candidate for public office." Id. at 370 n.7.
65. Id. at 382-83, 402. The Court stated that Congress, through its Commerce Clause
power, could regulate broadcast media in order to secure an even-handed presentation of
opinions. Id. at 376-77. However, these speech-restrictive regulations had only been al-
lowed when "narrowly tailored to further a substantial government interest." Id. at 380.
The Government argued that it banned noncommercial educational broadcasting stations
from editorializing in order to shield the affected stations from coercive government per-
suasion or from becoming a mouthpiece for government messages, and from being a soap-
box dedicated to the views of station owners. Id. at 384-85, 396. However, section 399
prohibited station editorials not related to government affairs, and the Government failed
to explain how such editorials would so outrage federal or state governments as to threaten
public broadcasting's existence. Id. at 392-95. Thus, the Court found the FCC's first as-
serted interest to be overbroad. Id. at 395. The Government's second asserted interest
lacked support because others appearing on the public broadcasting stations could pro-
mote the stations' opinions. Id. at 396. In this manner, section 399 was underinclusive of
its goals because it failed to ensure that the stations would not become outlets of their own
favored views. See id. at 396-97. Section 399 ensured only that station management could
not editorialize on their views. Id. at 397. Therefore, the ban was both overinclusive and
underinclusive and did not substantially advance its own goals. Id. at 396, 402.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
it would have upheld the section 399 restriction if the government
had allowed the stations to establish separate, privately funded affili-
ates for editorializing. 66
Relying heavily on its reasoning in Regan and Cammarano, the
Court held in Rust v. Sullivan67 that the Department of Health and
Human Services did not violate the First Amendment when it denied
Title X funds to family planning service providers that engaged in
abortion-related activities." The Court reasoned that the government
permissibly defined the scope of its subsidy and allowed Title X grant-
ees to create affiliates to engage in abortion-related speech. 69 Rust
argued that conditioning Title X funds upon relinquishing the right
to engage in abortion advocacy and counseling "invidiously discrimi-
nates" and penalizes non-Title X funded speech.7" The Court re-
jected that argument stating, "we have here not the case of a general
law singling out a disfavored group on the basis of speech content, but
a case of the Government refusing to fund activities, including speech,
which are specifically excluded from the scope of the project
funded."71 Quite unlike League of Women Voters, the Court found that
the Title X restriction was sufficiently tailored to meet Congress's in-
tent to not encourage abortion as a family planning method.72 Al-
though not directly stated, the Court implied that Title X did not
subsidize private free speech, but rather used Title X doctors to pro-
pound a government message.7" Additionally, Title X allowed recipi-
66. Id. at 400.
67. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
68. Id. at 203. In 1988, the Secretary of Health and Human Services promulgated regu-
lations to clarify the use of Tide X funds. Id. at 179. As a result, Title X funds could be
used for preconceptional services only, not for pregnancy-related services such as abortion.
Id, The Title X doctors could not even refer a patient to an abortion provider. Id. at 180.
However, Title X grantees could engage in the proscribed activities if such activities were
kept sufficiently separate from Title X authorized work. Id. Rust challenged the regula-
tions as an impermissible construction of the statute and as violative of the First and Fifth
Amendments. Id at 181. The District Court granted summary judgment against Rust. Id.
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the regulations permissibly construed the statute
and rejected Rust's Fifth Amendment claim. Id. at 181-82. The Second Circuit also re-
jected Rust's First Amendment arguments by reasoning that the government was not re-
quired to fund the exercise of free speech rights and Title X grantees could express any
abortion-related views outside the confines of a Title X project. Id. at 182-83.
69. Id. at 196-99.
70. Id. at 192. Rust garnered support from Regan, where the Court stated that govern-
ment could not condition acceptance of a subsidy in order to suppress certain viewpoints.
Id.
71. Id. at 194-95.
72. Id. at 195 n.4.
73. See id. at 194. The Rosenberger Court affirmatively stated the Rust Court's implica-
tion that government may enlist private speakers to convey government messages and take
[VOL. 61:454
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ents to form and participate in affiliate organizations that performed
abortion-related services.74 Finally, the Court rebuffed Rust's argu-
ment that most Title X recipients are poor and that the abortion re-
striction "effectively precluded" them from seeing a provider who
could perform abortion counseling and services.75 The Court simply
stated that Title X recipients are no worse off than if Title X never
existed.76
Finally, in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,77 the Court
held that a statute requiring consideration of decency and respect
when funding artists is facially valid under the First Amendment.78
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor found that 20 U.S.C.
§ 954(d) (1) only required National Endowment for the Arts (NEA)
advisory panels to consider decency and respect when allocating funds
to support the arts.79 The statutory language did not proscribe gov-
ernment funding for "indecent" or "disrespectful" art.8" Recognizing
that arts funding is inherently content based, the Court stated that the
NEA had scarce monetary resources and must reject funding for many
appropriate steps to ensure that the grantee expresses the government's view. Rosenber-
ger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
74. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196. The regulation required affiliates to sufficiently separate Ti-
tIe X funds from non-Title X funds by meeting certain program integrity standards. Id
However, the Court clarified that restrictive government subsidies coupled with the right
to conduct prohibited activities in an affiliate organization will not always justify the gov-
ernment's speech restrictions. Id. at 199-200.
75. Id. at 203.
76. Id. The Court supported its argument by stating, "[t]he financial constraints that
restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected
freedom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortion,
but rather of her indigency." Id. (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)).
77. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
78. Id. at 572-73.
79. Id. at 581-82. The statute provided:
No payment shall be made under this section except upon application therefor
which is submitted to the National Endowment for the Arts in accordance with
regulations issued and procedures established by the Chairperson. In establish-
ing such regulations and procedures, the Chairperson shall ensure that-
(1) artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which applications
are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect
for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public ....
20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994).
80. Finley, 524 U.S. at 580. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia wrote that by declaring
the "decency" and "respect" language of § 954(d)(1) to be advisory in nature, the majority
rendered the proviso meaningless. See id. at 591 (Scalia, J., concurring). He opined that
§ 954(d) (1) was viewpoint-based discrimination because the statute's language favored de-
cent and respectful art. Id. at 593. However, Justice Scalia stated that the statute did not
violate the Free Speech Clause because the speech of artists with indecent and disrespect-
ful creations was "as unconstrained now as [it was] before the enactment of this statute."
Id. at 595.
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"artistically excellent" submissions.8' The Court found that NEA's
competitive funding process did not "indiscriminately encourage a di-
versity of views from private speakers"; rather, NEA's content-based
"excellence" standard created a competition for funds.82 Because de-
cency and respect were merely considerations for funding, and the
government allocated scarce funds in a competitive process, the Court
found § 954(d) (1) constitutional.8 3 However, the Court cautioned
that NEA's use of the "decency" and "respect" standards could be-
come unconstitutional if NEA used those standards to penalize certain
viewpoints or to create a "coercive effect. "84
B. The Public Fora Cases
In addition to the unconstitutional conditions cases, the Court
has encountered cases where citizens claimed that the government
had violated their First Amendment right to speak freely in different
types of public areas. In Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n,85 the Court held that it was constitutional for a school to deny
the Perry Local Educators' Association (PLEA) access to Perry Town-
ship's internal school mail system.8 6 The Court wrote that there were
three types of fora: traditional public fora, limited public fora, and
nonpublic fora."v The majority deemed the Perry Township internal
mail system a nonpublic forum because the school mailboxes were not
available for public use and the school limited use of the system to
school-related matters.88 In such fora, the Court explained that the
government could exclude access based on identity or subject matter,
but only if doing so was reasonable considering the forum's purpose
and not an attempt to restrain a speaker's viewpoint.8 9 Because PLEA
bore no official relationship to the school, the school reasonably
could exclude PLEA from its internal mail system." In a manner sim-
ilar to its League of Women Voters analysis, the Court supported its find-
81. Finley, 524 U.S. at 585.
82. Id. at 586 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
834 (1995)).
83. Id. at 590.
84. Id. at 587.
85. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
86. Id. at 55. PLEA was the rival union of Perry Education Association (PEA), and PEA
had recently become the exclusive bargaining representative for the Township's teachers.
Id. at 39-40.
87. See id. at 45-46.
88. Id. at 46-48.
89. See id. at 46.
90. Id. at 51.
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ing of reasonableness by noting that PLEA had alternate means to
communicate with the teachers.91
Combining unconstitutional conditions and public fora analyses,
the Court held in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Vir-
ginia92 that the University of Virginia could not exclude certain view-
points from a forum if the University had created the forum to
encourage private speakers to express diverse viewpoints.9" Specifi-
cally, the Court found that the University violated the First Amend-
ment when it denied Student Activity Fund (SAF) money to a student
newspaper because the publication had a religious focus.94 The Court
stated that the SAF, in effect a subsidy, created a limited public forum
and that the University of Virginia could withhold funding on the ba-
sis of content if doing so maintained the forum's purpose.95 However,
the Court emphasized that the University could not discriminate on
the basis of viewpoint when the speech fell within the purpose of the
forum.9 6 The Court also explicitly addressed Rust's implication that
subsidies using private speakers to promulgate government speech are
treated differently than subsidies promoting a diversity of private
views.9 7 The majority wrote that government-subsidized, private
mouthpieces for governmental messages could be restrained from dis-
torting the government's message, but the Court prohibited view-
point-based discrimination when the government spent public funds
to "encourage a diversity of views from private speakers."98 Because
91. Id. at 53 (suggesting such expressive means as bulletin boards and the United
States mail).
92. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
93. Id. at 837.
94. Id. at 836-37. The student's publication, Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the
University of Virginia, offered its readers a Christian view on various topics. Id. at 826. The
University of Virginia attempted to justify its funding restrictions based on the Establish-
ment Clause. Id. at 837. However, the Court determined that a university did not violate
the Establishment Clause by providing "secular services for secular purposes on a religion-
neutral basis" to a group that was not a "religious institution." Id. at 843-44.
95. Id. at 829.
96. Id. The Court acknowledged that the SAF was more of a "metaphysical" forum
than a "spatial" or "geographic" forum. Id. at 830.
97. Id. at 833-34. Professor Nicole C;Isarez criticized the Rosenberger opinion because it
failed to provide a sure way to determine whether private speakers have become govern-
ment mouthpieces by accepting a subsidy. Nicole B. CIsarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsi-
dies, and Shifting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination, 64 ALB. L. REv. 501, 558 (2000).
Noting that the mere receipt of Title X funds in Rust determined government speaker
status, while subsidization in "the press cases" or in Rosenberger did not determine speaker
status, she argued, "[a]ny rationale to explain why the press remains private after benefit-
ing from a government subsidy would, therefore, seem to apply to physicians or other
professionals, as well." Id.
98. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833-34.
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the University had created a forum for expressing diverse private view-
points through the SAF, the Court ruled that the University could not
withhold funding to a group based on its religious viewpoint.99
In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 0° the Court
held that speakers can be excluded from a forum in a constitutional,
viewpoint-neutral manner even though those speakers may be identi-
fied by their viewpoint.'' Specifically, the Court did not find view-
point-based discrimination when a state-owned public television
station excluded a candidate from appearing in a political debate. 10 2
Traditionally, the Court has refused to discuss public broadcasters' ac-
tivity under its public fora analysis, but the Court made a special ex-
ception for political debates.'0 3 Because the debates did not have an
"open-microphone format," the Arkansas Educational Television
Commission (AETC) restricted participation to those seeking the
Third Congressional District seat in Arkansas, and AETC then further
narrowed the pool of eligible candidates, the Court classified the de-
bate as a nonpublic forum. 1°4 The majority found that AETC had not
excluded the plaintiff from the forum based on his viewpoint; 05
rather, AETC had reasonably excluded Forbes because of his status as
a weak contender for office. 106 Furthermore, it troubled the majority
that if faced with "cacophony, on the one hand, and First Amendment
liability, on the other, a public television broadcaster might choose
99. Id. at 834-35.
100. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
101. Id. at 683.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 675. Broadcast facilities are not open on a "nonselective basis" to any party
wishing to express their views. Id. at 673. The Court explained that public broadcasters
have statutorily imposed guidelines for their programming content, and that public fora
analysis could impede the broadcasters' "legitimate purposes." Id. at 673-74. Moreover, in
most situations, the First Amendment does not compel public broadcasters to permit ac-
cess to all third parties. Id. at 675. However, the Court wrote, "[a]lthough public broad-
casting as a general matter does not lend itself to scrutiny under the forum doctrine,
candidate debates present a narrow exception to the rule." Id. The Court gave two rea-
sons for differentiating political debates from other programming. First, political debates
allow candidates to express their own views, not the broadcaster's political views. Id. Sec-
ond, many viewers base their votes upon critical pieces of information gleaned from the
candidates' dialogue. Id. at 675-76. The Court stated that viewpoint-based discrimination
would bias the "electoral dialogue." Id. at 676.
104. See id. at 680.
105. Id. at 682.
106. Id. at 682-83. After reviewing the record, the Court discovered sufficient evidence
for finding that AETC excluded Forbes from the debate because of lack of public interest
in him. Id. at 682. AETC's executive director testified at trial that the voters and the news
media did not consider Forbes to be a serious candidate. Id. Even Forbes admitted to the
disarray of his campaign and his meager media coverage. Id.
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not to air candidates' views at all."1 ° 7 Therefore, the Court held that
AETC did not violate the First Amendment when it excluded weak
candidates from a public broadcasting station's political debate in a
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral manner.1 0
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the Supreme Court held that
Congress violated the First Amendment guarantee of free speech
when it appropriated LSC funding that prohibited grantees from liti-
gating on behalf of welfare recipients who wished to amend or chal-
lenge existing welfare law.' 0' Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority,"11 first discussed the Court's ruling in Rust v. Sullivan."' In
reviewing Rust, the Court recognized that it upheld Congress's deci-
sion not to subsidize abortion as a family planning method because
Congress had the liberty to "fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other.""' 2 However, the Court distinguished Velazquez from Rust be-
cause Rust involved a subsidy to facilitate private expression of the gov-
ernment's message, while Velazquez involved LSC funding designed to
facilitate private speech. 1 ' The Court explained that Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia allowed viewpoint discrimina-
tion when the government or its agent spoke, but found such discrimi-
nation inappropriate when the government funded private speakers
to express a "diversity of views."' 14 Conceding that Congress did not
create the LSC program to "encourage a diversity of views," the major-
ity insisted that the critical distinction between Rust and Velazquez was
that Velazquez's LSC funding sponsored private speech while Rust's Ti-
dle X funding promoted a governmental message." 5 Accordingly, the
Court wrote that the government does not enjoy the same broad pow-
ers to limit speech in the LSC subsidy program, and other such subsi-
dies for private speech, as the government does to limit speech when
it funds private speakers to dispense a government message.'6
107. Id. at 681.
108. Id. at 683.
109. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 537.
110. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Kennedy in his opin-
ion. Id. at 535.
111. See id. at 540-41.
112. Id. at 541 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)).
113. Id. at 541-42.
114. Id. at 542 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
834 (1995)).
115. Id. at 54243.
116. See id. at 542.
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In Velazquez, the Court determined that subsidies for private
speech violate free speech rights when the government attempts to
control an existing medium of expression "in ways which distort its
usual functioning." '117 Although the Court classified LSC funding as a
subsidy, it asserted that prior forum decisions provided relevant in-
struction for deciding Velazquez." 8 The Court explained that limited
forum cases were helpful because both limited fora and subsidies
often require restrictions to properly define their respective pur-
poses.119 The Court also stated that the LSC program "presumes that
private, non-governmental speech is necessary, and a substantial re-
striction is placed upon that speech." 2 ° Using limited forum cases
such as Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes and Rosen-
berger, the Court explained that just as the government could not pro-
hibit the speech required for the appropriate operations of a
television station or a "college publication structure," the LSC subsidy
could not restrict the normal functioning of the judicial process.1 21
The majority found that the proviso distorted an existing medium of
expression-the judicial system-by limiting the function of attorneys
within the courts.12 2 If a constitutional issue presented itself, whether
at initial consultation or at trial, the proviso compelled the LSC-
funded attorney to immediately terminate her representation. 121 In
such a situation, the Court noted that LSC clients would often be una-
ble to retain other counsel, and "there is no alternative channel for
expression of the advocacy Congress seeks to restrict. "124
It troubled the majority that when the proviso forced a LSC law-
yer to cease representation, there would be uncertainty as to whether
the LSC attorneys "present[ed] all the reasonable ... arguments nec-
essary for proper resolution of the case."1 25 As a result, the Court rea-
soned that the proviso restrained the judiciary from fully deciding all
matters before it and insulated Congress's welfare laws from judicial
117. See id. at 543.
118. Id. at 543-44.
119. Id. at 543.
120. Id. at 544.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 544-45.
124. Id. at 546-47.
125. Id. at 545. The Court wrote:
By seeking to prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues and to truncate presenta-
tion to the courts, the enactment under review prohibits speech and expression
upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power.
Congress cannot wrest the law from the Constitution which is its source.
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examination. 126 Accordingly, the Supreme Court invalidated the pro-
viso as violative of the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. 127
However, the majority refused to decide whether to sever the proviso
from the rest of the statute.'2 8 The Court stated that neither party
briefed the severability issue and, in an exercise of "discretion and
prudential judgment," decided not to address the matter. 129
Justice Scalia countered the majority's opinion with an emphatic
dissent. 130 He conceded that a subsidy may abridge speech, but only
when the subsidy coerced the beliefs of unsubsidized parties. 13 1 Jus-
tice Scalia argued that the Court has found such coercion only when a
conditional subsidy was "aimed at the suppression of dangerous
ideas.1132 He then added that proving this type of coercion is even
more difficult in a subsidy for limited beneficiaries than it is in a gen-
erally applicable subsidy.133 Justice Scalia proceeded to recount the
pertinent facts of Rust v. Sullivan and explained that Rust's holding
meant that government may choose to subsidize certain programs
without subsidizing their alternatives.13 4 Furthermore, Justice Scalia
argued that Rust's Title X program, like Velazquez's LSC subsidy, did
not create a forum and did not "encourag[e] a diversity of views." 135
He then concluded that Rust should have controlled the outcome of
Velazquez, and that the proviso should have been found constitutional
because the failure to subsidize a right does not mean that the right
has been infringed.' 3 6
Justice Scalia found particularly disconcerting the majority's as-
sertion that a private speech subsidy violates the First Amendment if
the subsidy "distorts" a medium of expression.'3 7 He declared that no
precedent existed for that holding.' 3 8 Furthermore, Justice Scalia sug-
gested that the Court erred by characterizing the First Amendment
question as whether the LSC funding scheme "distort[ed] an existing
126. Id. at 546.
127. Id. at 549.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 549-63 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and
Justice Thomas joined in Justice Scalia's dissent. Id. at 549.
131. Id. at 552.
132. Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 553.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 553-54.
137. Id. at 554-55.
138. Id. at 555 ("[T]here is utterly no precedent for the novel and facially implausible
proposition that the First Amendment has anything to do with government funding
that. . . 'distorts an existing medium of expression.'").
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medium of expression" because the restriction did not deter anyone
from initiating an attack on welfare law.139 He explained that section
504(a) (16) simply meant LSC grantees and their clients could not use
LSC funds to make the proscribed arguments in court.1 40 According
to Justice Scalia, this did not distort the function of the courts because
" [c]ourts must consider only those questions... that are presented by the
litigants, and if the Government chooses not to subsidize the presenta-
tion of some such questions, that in no way 'distorts' the courts'
role." '141
Justice Scalia next addressed the majority's concern that a LSC
attorney's client would not be able to find representation if the LSC
attorney were forced to withdraw.142 Justice Scalia explained that this
concern was "irrelevant" because such a LSC client was "in no worse
condition than he would have been in had the LSC program never
been enacted." 43 Finally, Justice Scalia added that even if he were to
agree with the majority, the Court must reach the severability ques-
tion.'44 He concluded that the proviso was not severable from the
statute. 45
139. Id. at 555-56.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 557.
143. Id. Justice Scalia noted that the Rust majority made this same argument when it
stated that people who wanted to use Title X funds for abortions, but were precluded from
doing so, would be "in no worse position than if Congress had never enacted Title X." Id.
(quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991)). Justice Scalia conceded that Velazquez
was distinguishable from Rust because the Rust clients could still receive the Title X services
and get abortion counseling with their own means, while LSC clients could not retain a
LSC attorney if a prohibited issue arose during litigation. Id. at 558. However, Justice
Scalia argued that the distinction was irrelevant and determined that the proviso did not
violate the First Amendment because it did not coerce or manipulate those who did not
espouse the "subsidized position." Id. He conceded that the result might have been differ-
ent if the LSC clients could waive their right to make the proscribed arguments in order to
retain a LSC attorney; but the client could not do so under the LSC regulatory scheme. Id.
Therefore, Justice Scalia concluded that there was no coercive effect. Id.
144. Id. at 559.
145. Id. at 560. Justice Scalia stated that although neither party briefed the issue of
severability, it would be "an abuse of discretion to ignore it." Id, at 559. Justice Scalia felt
that the "statute concocted by the [Second Circuit] bears little resemblance to what Con-
gress enacted .... " Id.
Justice Scalia maintained that in order to determine severability, the Court must look
into a statute's legislative intent. Id. at 560. He noted that Congress intended to keep the
LSC funding program free from political pressures. Id. Because the proviso was meant to
address such political pressure, Justice Scalia determined that the proviso could not be
struck without voiding all of § 504(a)(16). Id. at 561. Justice Scalia also wrote:
We have in some cases stated that when an "excepting proviso is found unconsti-
tutional the substantive provisions which it qualifies cannot stand," for "to hold
otherwise would be to extend the scope of the law ... so as to embrace [situa-
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IV. ANALYSIS
In Velazquez, the Court invalidated a government subsidy as an
abridgment of free speech because the subsidy facilitated private
speech and distorted the functioning of "an existing medium of ex-
pression."146 The Court's distortion doctrine provides an unworkable
guideline for future decisions because it supplies no concrete bounda-
ries. Any change in a subsidy, even an increase in funding, could be
struck down as unconstitutional if it changes an expressive medium's
function. As Justice Scalia wrote in his dissent, the Court's holding
makes certain subsidies unconstitutional even though they do not
abridge anyone's speech. 147 Furthermore, the Court implausibly ex-
tended its public forum and unconstitutional conditions cases to sup-
port its ruling.14 Indeed, the Court should have analyzed Velazquez
for what it was-content-based discrimination. Such an analysis would
have revealed that the proviso discriminated based on speech content.
However, because Congress provided an alternate avenue of expres-
sion for the LSC clients, the proviso does not coerce the beliefs of LSC
clients and, consequently, does not violate the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment.
149
A. Medium Distortion: A Flawed Interpretation of Precedent
As support for its distortion principle, the Court overbroadened
the rationale for its holdings in four previous cases: Federal Communica-
tions Commission v. League of Women Voters, Arkansas Educational Televi-
sion Commission v. Forbes, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia, and Pery Education Ass'n v. Peny Local Educators' Ass'n. In
League of Women Voters, the Court found that a government subsidy for
tions] which the legislature passing the statute had, by its very terms, expressly
excluded."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Frost v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla., 278 U.S. 515, 525
(1929)). As a result, Justice Scalia determined that striking the § 504(a) (16) proviso im-
permissibly rewrote legislation and changed the statute's effect. Id. at 561-62. But see supra
note 25 and accompanying text (explaining the Second Circuit's rationale for severing the
proviso). Different views regarding severability arise because the subject continues to exist
as an unsettled field ofjurisprudence. John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REv.
203, 211 (1993). Nagle suggests that the Court supplant its malleable severability standard
with its approach to statutory construction in order to yield more predictable results. Id. at
206.
146. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543.
147. Id. at 554-55 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543-44 (justifying the use of limited forum principles solely
because both subsidies and limited fora have restrictions necessary to delineate their re-
spective programs).
149. The government allowed LSC grantees to create separate, privately funded affili-
ates to engage in the proscribed activity. Id. at 555-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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public, noncommercial educational broadcasting stations, condi-
tioned upon relinquishment of editorializing rights, violated the First
Amendment.150 Drawing upon League of Women Voters, the Velazquez
Court determined that the government may not make an aberrant use
of a forum in order to restrain speech normally found in that fo-
rum.15 ' The League of Women Voters opinion does not mention this
rationale.'52 In fact, the League of Women Voters holding emphasized
the funding prohibition's content-based nature and Congress's failure
to narrowly define the prohibition in light of its proffered goals. 153
Furthermore, League of Women Voters stressed that the editorializing
prohibition would have been constitutional, regardless of its content
discriminatory nature, if the government had allowed broadcasters to
editorialize through sufficiently separate, privately funded affiliate
organizations. 154
As Justice Scalia highlighted in his dissent, Congress allowed LSC
grantees to form such affiliate organizations.'5 5 The LSC regulation
deemed an affiliate to be sufficiently separate if the affiliate operated
as a "legally separate entity," it "receive [d] no transfer of LSC funds,
and LSC funds [did] not subsidize restricted activities," and it was
"physically and financially separate from the other organization."156
To be an independent organization, the regulation mandated that the
totality of the circumstances regarding separate activities be consid-
ered; however, the regulation expressly stated that separate bookkeep-
ing alone was insufficient to establish a separate affiliate.' 57 When
LSC promulgated this rule, it took steps to model the program integ-
rity standards in 45 C.F.R. § 1610.8(a) after those found constitutional
150. Fed. Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402
(1984).
151. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543.
152. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 398-99 (finding that a conditional subsidy
precluding broadcasters from editorializing was unconstitutional because the speech re-
striction was not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest); see also Velaz-
quez, 531 U.S. at 555-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia reminded the majority that
the League of Women Voters Court felt that the government did not have a substantial
enough interest in ensuring that public radio stations did not become a private soapbox
for espousing the station owners' views. Id.
153. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 383, 398-99.
154. Id. at 400.
155. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 555-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. Legal Services Corporation, 45 C.F.R. § 1610.8(a)(1)-(3) (2000).
157. Id. § 1610.8(a) (3). But see Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540,
545 n.6 (1983) (suggesting that affiliate program integrity requirements could become
unduly burdensome at some point); see also id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (sug-
gesting that any requirement imposed on affiliates beyond recordkeeping "would negate
the saving effect" of affiliate formation).
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in Rust.' For instance, LSC provided some factors, such as the exis-
tence of separate personnel, accounting records, and timekeeping
records, that could be considered when examining the totality of the
circumstances.159 Other factors included the "degree of separation
from . . . restricted activities" and outward signs that the affiliate was
identifiable as a separate organization. 60 Because League of Women
Voters would have allowed a subsidy with a content-based speech re-
striction to stand if the statute had provided for an affiliate organiza-
tion, 1 ' and the LSC modeled its affiliate organization after the
affiliate approved in Rust, the Court should have found the subsidy
restriction at issue in Velazquez constitutional. Accordingly, the major-
ity's reliance on League of Women Voters to support its distortion princi-
ple was misplaced.
The Velazquez Court indirectly rejected the affiliate argument be-
cause of the LSC clients' indigency.' 62 The Court stated, "in cases
where the attorney withdraws from a representation, the client is un-
likely to find other counsel."' 63 However, just ten years before Velaz-
quez, the Rust Court refused to give any weight to the indigency of the
women denied Title X funding. 64 The Velazquez Court attempted to
reconcile this difference by reasoning that LSC clients forfeited repre-
sentation when a proscribed issue surfaced, but Title X clients could
obtain the permitted family planning services and still go elsewhere
for abortion counseling. 65 However, the Title X family planning ser-
vices mean very little if the client wants an abortion or information
about abortion. Furthermore, LSC clients do retain the advice of
their LSC attorneys.166 Thus, if the LSC client is able to obtain an-
other attorney through a privately funded LSC affiliate, she retains the
benefit of the LSC attorney's prior services. Because alternate routes
of expression remain open for LSC clients, the proviso does not co-
158. Use of Non-LSC Funds, Transfers of LSC Funds, Program Integrity, 62 Fed. Reg.
27,695, 27,697 (May 21, 1997) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1610).
159. 45 C.F.R. § 1610.8(a) (3) (i)-(ii).
160. Id. § 1610.8(a) (3) (iii)-(iv).
161. Fed. Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400
(1984).
162. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546-47.
163. Id. at 546.
164. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991).
165. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 547.
166. See id. at 551 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that an attorney who ceases repre-
sentation under the proviso must tell the client why she is ceasing representation, is free to
offer her view of the welfare law's legality, and "may refer the client to another lawyer who
can accept the representation").
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erce the indigent LSC client into adopting the government's view any
more than did the Title X provision found constitutional in Rust. 16 7
Just as the majority misconstrued League of Women Voters to sup-
port its distortion principle, it also misconstrued Arkansas Educational
Television Commission v. Forbes's holding to mean that the government
was prohibited from disrupting the usual functioning of a public tele-
vision station by proscribing speech intrinsic in that medium. 68
Forbes's holding rested on the forum's purpose, not the forum's func-
tioning. 6 ' Forbes determined that a political debate on a state-owned
public broadcasting station constituted a nonpublic forum, and that
the First Amendment allowed stations to make content-based candi-
date exclusions from the debate if doing so was reasonable consider-
ing the forum's purpose. 170 Furthermore, the Velazquez majority did
not apply Forbes's reasonableness test. Instead, the Velazquez Court
considered whether the LSC subsidy distorted the functioning of the
legal system.17' Therefore, Forbes provided yet another unsuitable case
to support the Court's decision.
Perhaps even more troublesome is the Court's use of limited fo-
rum precedent, such as Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n and Rosenberger, as the foundation for its distortion principle. 72
Those cases prove to be inapposite because the LSC subsidy does not
create a forum.' 7 3 Despite acknowledging that the LSC funding pro-
gram constituted a subsidy, and limited forum precedent did not con-
trol this case, the Velazquez majority reasoned that LSC funding was
like a limited forum because both contained limitations in order to
define their respective purposes. 174 The Court found this similarity
sufficient to guide its decision. 175 The majority explained that limited
forum cases such as Rosenberger proscribed interference with the
proper functioning of limited fora.1 76 By analogy, the LSC subsidy,
167. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 203 (noting that the Title X clients' indigency may well pre-
clude them from exercising all of their constitutionally guaranteed rights, but that preclu-
sion did not result from government interference through Title X).
168. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543.
169. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 682 (1998).
170. Id. The Court stated that "[t]o be consistent with the First Amendment, the exclu-
sion of a speaker from a nonpublic forum must not be based on the speaker's viewpoint
and must otherwise be reasonable in light of the purpose of the property." Id. (emphasis added).
171. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543.
172. Id. at 543-44. Because both subsidies and limited fora have restrictions necessary to
define their respective programs, the Court found instructive cases such as Peny Education
Ass'n and Rosenberger, which examined limited fora. Id. at 544.
173. Id. at 553 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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which distorted the functioning of the judiciary according to the
Court, also violated the First Amendment.177 However, neither Rosen-
berger nor its predecessor Perry Education Ass'n mentioned distortion of
an existing medium's function. 7 ' The limited forum rationale dis-
cussed in Perry Education Ass'n allowed content-based discrimination
only when narrowly drawn to preserve a strong state interest. 7 ' Fur-
thermore, Rosenberger dealt with viewpoint-based discrimination in a
limited forum and found such discrimination to be presumptively un-
constitutional when the prohibited speech fell within the forum's
boundaries. 8 ' Even assuming limited forum analysis to be applicable
and instructive, the Velazquez Court failed to use the content-based or
viewpoint-based rationale provided in Perry Education Ass'n and Rosen-
berger. Accordingly, the fora platform the Court used to reach its dis-
tortion principle was illusory.
B. Distortion: An Unworkable Principle
Regardless of the Court's rationale for its distortion principle, de-
termining a First Amendment violation by measuring whether the gov-
ernment used a subsidy "in ways which distort[ed] [the medium's]
usual functioning"181 suggests that forum functions become un-
changeable once created. The Court's distortion principle implies
that some ultimate norm of subsidized expression exists against which
all changes to that medium must be measured.'8 2 By choosing the
word "distortion," one can infer that a medium of expression's first
incarnation is immutable and subsequent governmental modifications
of a medium's function via subsidy are impermissible.' Such a prin-
177. Id.
178. Id. at 555 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (arguing that the Velazquez majority wrongly focused
on the functioning of the student publications in Rosenberger and, instead, the majority
should have focused on the distortion of the public forum). Of course, the LSC subsidy
did not create the courts (the only conceivable forum), it merely facilitated access to them.
Furthermore, Peny's discussion of the limited forum concept centered on content-based
discrimination. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46
(1983).
179. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
180. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995).
181. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543.
182. See Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1, 53 (2000). Profes-
sor Greene notes that many scholars object to government lessening the level of discourse
in a forum. Id. He finds that "the scholars artificially establish a baseline of extant social
practice against which government seeking a forum change appears deviant." Id. Profes-
sor Greene argues that we should view social norms as "plastic rather than as fixed" and
analyze each forum case to determine whether the government has monopolized, coerced,




ciple may lead to invalidation of subsidies that the public considers
beneficial.11 4 Taking the Velazquez rationale to its logical ends, the
LSC subsidy itself could become an unconstitutional speech restric-
tion. If Congress substantially increased LSC appropriations in order
to allow LSC to take all of its cases and removed other funding use
restrictions, the functioning of the legal system would be distorted be-
cause such a subsidy likely would result in a dramatic increase in the
federal courts' caseloads.1 s5 These extra cases ostensibly would add to
the courts' already voluminous caseload.'8 6
Increased caseloads may mean that indigents who otherwise pre-
sent triable cases may never receive an actual trial because of in-
creased reliance on the pretrial judicial management techniques
allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)."' Ar-
guably a shift in judicial function from actual trial to pretrial manage-
ment distorts the functioning of an existing medium of expression.188
As an example, FRCP 16(a) (5) allows for a trial, but gives a judge
184. See id. at 57. In the context of government speech, Professor Greene argues:
[W]hen government changes the nature of a forum, it represents the desire of
the current majority, and it is a contradiction not easily resolvable to oppose such
a desire with an alternative conception of extant practice, for the desire is at least
some evidence of the demise of such practice.
Id.
185. LSC programs reach only approximately 20% of the eligible individuals that need
legal assistance. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, A SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESs-APRIL 30,
2000, at 12-13 (2000). LSC stated, "[u]nfortunately because of limited resources, local
legal services programs are forced to turn away tens of thousands of people with critical
legal problems." LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, 25TH ANNIVERSARY ANNUAL REPORT 15
(1999). The Velazquez Court added that those financially qualified to be LSC clients, but
barred from LSC services because of the nature of their claim, are "unlikely to find other
counsel" because they cannot afford legal assistance. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546.
In 1999 alone, "LSC grantees reported closing 1,038,662 civil legal cases." A SPECIAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS-APRIL 30, 2000, supra, at 6. Of those, 9% resulted in a court deci-
sion, 4% resulted in agency decision, and 4% resulted in a settlement with litigation. Id. at
2. As a result, there were 176,572 LSC cases in the court system (including administrative
agencies) in 1999. This number could be as much as five times higher if LSC had suffi-
cient funds to represent all eligible clients. See id. at 12-13. This is significant considering
that plaintiffs filed 260,271 civil cases in the United States Federal District Courts in 1999.
U.S. Courts, U.S. District Court-Judicial Caseload Profile, at http://www.uscourts.gov/
cgi-bin/cmsdl999.pl (last visited Dec. 29, 2001).
186. The Court has noted, "[iut seems doubtful that our judicial system would have the
resources to provide litigants with perfect trials, were they possible, and still keep abreast of
its constantly increasing case load." McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464
U.S. 548, 553 (1984).
187. See Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Manage-
rial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 41, 61, 67 (1995).
188. See id. at 84 (suggesting that the Framers intended the judiciary to preside over
trials, and that the Framers did not foresee the "development of managerial judging").
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power to force attendance at pretrial settlement conferences.1 89
Some scholars suggest that judges use pretrial judicial management
techniques coercively, and that such techniques have an unintended
coercive effect on litigants.19 0 Accordingly, the indigent client may
not get her chance to speak in court.
Admittedly, the prior subsidy cases considered by the Velazquez
Court dealt with an express congressional restriction on a subsidy's
use. However, the hypothetically expanded LSC, coupled with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, distorts the normal functioning of
the judiciary just the same by pushing judges closer towards function-
ing as pretrial settlement coordinators and away from acting in their
traditional capacity as presiders over trial.'91 How far along that con-
tinuum the judicial role would have to change to amount to a "distor-
tion" remains unclear because Velazquez used the word "distortion"
without any modifier such as "significant" or "substantial." A literal
reading of Velazquez suggests that any distortion of an existing medium
of expression will result in a subsidy's invalidation. Therefore, the
Court's distortion principle is unworkable because the very act of sub-
sidization has the potential to distort the functioning of a medium,
192
and the distortion principle does not allow subsidies to change as the
needs and desires of society change.
C. A Proper Course of Action for the Court
The Supreme Court's content-discrimination analysis would have
provided the appropriate guidelines for deciding Velazquez. A subsidy
is invalid as content discriminatory if its use restriction prohibits a
speaker's expression on a topic, regardless of the speaker's view-
point.1 93 The proviso should have been found content discriminatory
189. FED. R. Ctv. P. 16(a) (5). However, the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 revi-
sions suggest that the unwillingness of one party to settle may show that settlement talks
would be unproductive, and that participants should not be forced to attend. FED. R. Civ.
P. 16 advisory committee's notes. This suggests that judges still have the power to force
attendance, but should use discretion when doing so.
190. Peterson, supra note 187, at 81.
191. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
192. Cf Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 185-86 (1996). Considering
governmental speech, Professor Post writes that some might think a government subsidy
which espouses one view over another changes the "public discourse" by unconstitutionally
altering its "natural diversity and spontaneous heterogeneity." Id. at 185. Professor Post
adds that the distortion concept is ineffectual once it is accepted that government may
subsidize the support of particular values. Id. He continues, "[e]very government inter-
vention in public discourse will change the nature of that discourse." Id. at 185-86.
193. Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1987).
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because it prohibited LSC recipients from challenging or defending
existing welfare law.194
A close examination of the LSC proviso shows that it discrimi-
nated based on content rather than viewpoint. The proviso allowed a
LSC client to seek relief from a welfare agency if the relief sought did
not involve an attempt to alter existing welfare law.'1 5 If the govern-
ment or the LSC client tried to challenge or amend existing welfare
law, the proviso required the LSC attorney to withdraw. 19 6 Accord-
ingly, the proviso did not restrict solely the LSC client's argument or
viewpoint. For example, if a state agency defended its actions in a
LSC client's case because that agency felt a federal welfare program
requirement was unconstitutional, then neither the government's
viewpoint nor the LSC client's viewpoint could be expressed. As a
result, the proviso prohibited the entire subject matter pertaining to
welfare law challenges from being discussed in court when a LSC cli-
ent was a party. Therefore, the proviso discriminated based on
content.
Because the proviso discriminated based on content, the Court
should have analyzed whether Congress narrowly designed the proviso
to serve a substantial government interest-in other words, applied
strict scrutiny.' 97 In Velazquez, the government's asserted interest in
the proviso was to help "the current welfare system function in a more
efficient and fair manner by removing from the program complex
challenges to existing welfare laws," by providing for "simple suits for
benefits." '198 Even if the Court accepted that the LSC subsidy's restric-
tion served a substantial government interest, restricting LSC grantees
from advocating on behalf of clients who wish to amend existing wel-
fare law is underinclusive of the government's goal to fund "simple"
lawsuits.
To elucidate the LSC proviso's underinclusiveness, one can ex-
amine a welfare program at the state level. Consideration of state
rather than federal welfare regulations is necessary because Con-
194. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 551 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-134, § 504(a) (16), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-55 to -56.
196. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 551 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197. See Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987) (stating that a
content-based tax applied only to certain magazines must be "necessary to serve a compel-
ling state interest and . . .narrowly drawn to achieve that end"); Fed. Communications
Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 398-99 (1984) (invalidating a content-
based broadcasting subsidy restriction using the strict scrutiny test); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 638 (1997) (asserting that governmental infringement of fundamen-
tal rights is subject to strict scrutiny).
198. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 547.
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gress's Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (PRWORA) dramatically reduced direct federal regulatory
authority in local welfare programs.' 99 However, the federal govern-
ment retains broad power to provide block grants to the states and
penalize states that fail to meet PRWORA's objectives. 00 PRWORA
also created the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) pro-
gram to confer block grants to each eligible state.20 1 The State of
Maryland uses a portion of its TANF block grant to provide monetary
assistance to the needy in a program called Temporary Cash Assis-
tance (TCA).202
The TCA program and its administrative appeals system provides
an example of the LSC proviso's underinclusiveness. If Maryland de-
nies TCA benefits to a TCA recipient (in this hypothetical situation a
LSC client), the recipient has the right to a fair hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ) prior to benefits termination.20 3 Mary-
land mandates that the recipient receive a case summary and each
document the state intends to enter into evidence six days before the
scheduled hearing.204 If the ALJ fails to grant a continuance to allow
the recipient to review the case summary and evidence,20 5 the recipi-
ent may feel that the State violated her due process rights.2 0 6 As a
result, the LSC client may seek to sue the State on Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process grounds.20 7 Certainly, the State did not act in ac-
199. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(Supp. V 1999)).
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a) (describing the federal grant-making power); id. § 609 (al-
lowing the federal government to penalize states for various state program failures).
201. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act tit. I.
202. See MD. REGS. CODE tit. VII, §§ .03.03.01-.17 (2000).
203. Id. § .01.04.03(B). The Supreme Court initially granted the right to a pretermina-
tion hearing as a matter of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970).
204. MD. REGS. CODE tit. VII, § .01.04.08(B) (1) (b). In discussing all that due process
requires in a pretermination hearing, Goldberg does not explicitly grant a right to discovery
in a fair hearing. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266-71. However, Goldberg does state that due pro-
cess requires that the hearing be conducted in a "meaningful manner." Id. at 267. The
TANF regulations merely require that a state provide an opportunity for adversely affected
recipients to be heard at a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1) (B) (iii).
205. The administrative law judge has discretion over whether or not to grant a continu-
ance. MD. REGS. CODE tit. VII, § .01.04.08(B)(2).
206. Professor Karen Czapanskiy of the University of Maryland School of Law presented
this hypothetical due process claim during a March 5, 2001 lecture.
207. A report describing the status of the Baltimore City Department of Social Services
stated:
Summaries are routinely given to unrepresented Appellants the morning of the
hearing, and even when appellants are represented, Summaries are rarely re-
ceived within the prescribed time. In addition to the Summary, the Appellant is
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cordance with its own administrative regulations, but whether or not
the State denied the LSC client due process of law does not challenge
or amend existing welfare law. Instead, the LSC client challenges the
State's failure to act in accordance with its laws. This hypothetical sce-
nario presents a complex constitutional question that would be allowed
into court under the LSC proviso, despite Congress's attempt to limit
LSC representation to simple suits for benefits. Because Congress ex-
cluded from litigation the entire topic of welfare reform and because
the proviso is not narrowly tailored to meet the asserted state interest,
section 504(a) (16) without more, is unconstitutional. However, there
is another provision that saves the proviso from being unconstitu-
tional.
Section 504(a) (16) remains constitutional under the First
Amendment because LSC grantees may create privately funded affili-
ates in order to engage in the prohibited litigation.2"8 As a result of
the LSC affiliate provision, the government does not completely pro-
hibit discussion of welfare law in court. League of Women Voters sug-
gested in dicta that Congress may discriminate based on content
through a federal subsidy in a way that fails the strict scrutiny test if
the recipient may form an affiliate to engage in the restricted activ-
ity.2" 9 Therefore, the Court should find the LSC proviso constitu-
tional under the First Amendment because the government left open
alternate avenues of expression to LSC clients involved in challenges
to existing welfare law.210
V. CONCLUSION
The Velazquez Court systematically failed to support its distortion
principle through its analogy of subsidies to limited public fora. None
of the cases the Court relied upon mentioned distortion of an existing
medium of expression as an underlying principle. Furthermore, this
distortion principle creates a hair trigger for invalidation when a gov-
ernment subsidy changes a forum's function and may lead to unin-
tended results. The Court should have analyzed this case under its
entitled to review their file prior to the hearing. Appellants are not informed that
they have the right to see their file. Additionally, on many occasions files are lost
or never forwarded from the local office to the Appeals Unit.
FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRAM (FIP) LEGAL CLINIC, TIME OUT! A STATUS REPORT ON WEL-
FARE REFORM IN BALTIMORE CITY AT THE THREE YEAR MARK, As EXPERIENCED BY THOSE IT
WAS INTENDED TO HELP AND THEIR LEGAL ADVOCATES 32 (1999).
208. Legal Services Corporation, 45 C.F.R. § 1610.8 (2000).
209. Fed. Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400
(1984).
210. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 555-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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content-based discrimination analysis. In so doing, the Court would
have found that the proviso discriminated based on content and was
not narrowly drawn to serve a substantial government interest. How-
ever, the Court should have allowed the proviso to stand because Con-
gress allowed LSC to form affiliate organizations to engage in the
proscribed litigation.
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